file-path-traversal-testing
skills-sh:sickn33_antigravity-awesome-skills__file-path-traversal-testing
View sourceFirst Seen
Feb 18, 2026
Last Scanned
Feb 20, 2026
Findings
11
Score
0/100
Findings (11)
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
../../../etc/passwd Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
%2e%2e/ Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
%2e%2e% Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
%2e%2e/ Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
%2e%2e% Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.
Detects instructions to decode and execute base64 content
base64-encode/resource=config Remove text that simulates multi-turn conversations or fake user/assistant message pairs. These patterns attempt to manipulate the agent by fabricating conversation history.
Likely FP if the matched text is documentation showing example conversations or API request/response formats for illustration purposes.
Detects instructions to decode and execute base64 content
base64,PD9waHAgc3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWydjJ10pOyA/Pg== Remove text that simulates multi-turn conversations or fake user/assistant message pairs. These patterns attempt to manipulate the agent by fabricating conversation history.
Likely FP if the matched text is documentation showing example conversations or API request/response formats for illustration purposes.
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
%2e%2e% Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
../../../etc/passwd Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.
Detects instructions to decode and execute base64 content
base64-encode/resource=config Remove text that simulates multi-turn conversations or fake user/assistant message pairs. These patterns attempt to manipulate the agent by fabricating conversation history.
Likely FP if the matched text is documentation showing example conversations or API request/response formats for illustration purposes.
Detects path traversal patterns targeting sensitive files, including URL-encoded variants
%2e%2e% Pin Git dependencies to specific commit hashes instead of branch names or tags. Branches and tags are mutable and can be updated to point to malicious code.
Likely FP if the Git reference points to a tagged release of a well-known repository, though tags are technically mutable.