sandbox-agent

Download the file first, verify its integrity (checksum, signature), inspect it, then run it. Prefer package managers over raw downloads. Never fetch-and-run in one step.

Likely FP if the target is a well-known installer (e.g., rustup, Homebrew) from its canonical HTTPS domain, though the pattern is inherently risky.

Download the script first, inspect it, verify its checksum, then run it. Do not pipe curl/wget output directly to sh/bash. Prefer package manager installs.

Likely FP if the download is from a well-known installer domain (e.g., brew.sh, rustup.rs), though this pattern is inherently risky even with trusted sources.

Remove credential values from Docker environment flags (-e) and docker-compose environment sections. Use Docker secrets, .env files (in .dockerignore), or a secrets manager.

Likely FP if the Docker environment variable has an empty or placeholder value (e.g., -e API_KEY= or -e PASSWORD=changeme) in setup documentation.

Break chained commands into discrete, individually validated steps. Avoid piping untrusted output directly into a shell interpreter.

Likely FP if the matched text is a documentation example showing a common installer one-liner for a well-known tool with a canonical URL.

Replace npm install -g with a local install (npm install --save-dev) or use npx with a pinned version. Global installs modify the system and risk supply chain attacks.

Likely FP if the global install is for a well-known CLI tool (e.g., typescript, eslint) in setup documentation, though the supply chain risk remains real.