telegram-ops

clawhub:telegram-ops

View source
C
60/100

First Seen

Feb 18, 2026

Last Scanned

Feb 22, 2026

Findings

3

Score

60/100

CRITICAL 1
HIGH 1
LOW 1

Findings (3)

CRITICAL
Fake system prompt
L56

Detects content pretending to be a system prompt

system prompt:
FIX

Remove encoded or obfuscated directives (base64, ROT13, unicode escapes, hex-encoded text). All text should be in plaintext and human-readable.

FP?

Likely FP if the encoded content is legitimate data (e.g., a base64-encoded image, a hex-encoded binary hash) rather than concealed directives.

HIGH
Fetch URL and use as instructions
L26

Detects fetching external URLs and using the content as agent instructions or rules

prompt

### Step 1: Create via Bot API
FIX

Sanitize or validate all external inputs (file contents, API responses, user messages) before including them in prompts or tool calls. Implement input/output boundaries between trusted and untrusted data.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is the skill's own instruction set describing how to handle user input, not an actual injection payload.

LOW
Shell script file execution
L105

Detects execution of shell script files via bash/sh command or direct invocation

bash
scripts/archive_topic.sh
FIX

Replace direct shell script execution with a language-native implementation or a sandboxed executor. If shell scripts must run, restrict them to a vetted allowlist with integrity checks.

FP?

Likely FP if the match references running a script that is part of the skill's own repository (e.g., ./setup.sh) with clear, auditable contents.