multi-channel-engagement-agent

clawhub:multi-channel-engagement-agent

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B
77/100

First Seen

Feb 18, 2026

Last Scanned

Feb 22, 2026

Findings

3

Score

77/100

HIGH 1
MEDIUM 1
LOW 1

Findings (3)

HIGH
Private data read with public output
L121

Skill can read private data (credentials, SSH keys, env vars) AND write to public channels (Slack, Discord, email). This combination enables data exfiltration.

[reads_private_data] Read `config.json` for platform credentials + [writes_public_output] Send engagement results to Telegram or Discord
FIX

Break the toxic data flow by adding validation and sanitization between the input source and the sensitive operation. Do not pass untrusted data directly to file system, network, or execution APIs.

FP?

Likely FP if the data flow involves only trusted, hardcoded values and the taint analysis over-approximated the untrusted input sources.

MEDIUM
Cross-tool data leakage
L121

Detects patterns where credential or secret reads are combined with external data transmission

Read `config.json` for platform credential + post content
FIX

Prevent credentials and sensitive data obtained by one MCP tool from being passed to other tools. Implement data isolation between tools and restrict cross-tool data flow for secrets.

FP?

Likely FP if the cross-tool data flow is intentional API authentication (e.g., a tool fetches an auth token that another tool uses for the same service).

LOW
Runtime URL controlling behavior
L64

Detects URLs fetched at runtime that control or influence agent behavior without pinning

Get key: https:// + Config
FIX

Avoid loading configuration or behavior-controlling content from runtime URLs. Bundle required configurations locally or pin remote config to versioned, integrity-verified endpoints.

FP?

Likely FP if the URL in the match is a documentation link or example URL (e.g., example.com) rather than an actual runtime-fetched configuration endpoint.