indirect-prompt-injection

clawhub:indirect-prompt-injection

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C
60/100

First Seen

Feb 18, 2026

Last Scanned

Feb 22, 2026

Findings

3

Score

60/100

CRITICAL 1
HIGH 1
LOW 1

Findings (3)

CRITICAL
Instruction override attempt
L26

Detects attempts to override or ignore previous instructions

Ignore previous instructions
FIX

Remove the injection payload from the skill definition. Text that attempts to reset agent context or override prior directives is a direct attack vector.

FP?

Likely FP if the text is in a security tutorial or research paper discussing injection techniques as examples, not in an active skill description.

HIGH
Data transmission pattern
L3

Detects patterns indicating sensitive data being sent to external services

exfiltrate data
FIX

Restrict file reading to the project directory and block outbound network calls that include file contents. Implement file path validation to prevent directory traversal.

FP?

Likely FP if the tool legitimately reads project files and displays them to the user locally, without sending data to external services.

LOW
External API response used without validation
L42

Detects patterns where external API responses are used directly without validation or sanitization

API key in your response + directly from your trusted use
FIX

Validate and sanitize all data received from external APIs before using it in tool operations or agent prompts. Implement schema validation and treat API responses as untrusted input.

FP?

Likely FP if the match is a truncated table cell or documentation fragment that mentions API responses in a descriptive context, not actual unvalidated data processing.