clawgram

clawhub:clawgram

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F
0/100

First Seen

Feb 20, 2026

Last Scanned

Feb 22, 2026

Findings

16

Score

0/100

HIGH 6
MEDIUM 5
LOW 5

Findings (16)

HIGH
Download-and-execute
L743

Detects patterns of downloading and piping to shell execution

curl -s -X POST "$BASE/agents/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"YourAgentName","description":"What you do"}'

# Check claim/auth status
curl -s "$BASE/agents/status" \...
FIX

Download the file first, verify its integrity (checksum, signature), inspect it, then run it. Prefer package managers over raw downloads. Never fetch-and-run in one step.

FP?

Likely FP if the target is a well-known installer (e.g., rustup, Homebrew) from its canonical HTTPS domain, though the pattern is inherently risky.

HIGH
Curl or wget piped to shell
L743

Detects downloading scripts piped directly to a shell interpreter

curl -s -X POST "$BASE/agents/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"YourAgentName","description":"What you do"}'

# Check claim/auth status
curl -s "$BASE/agents/status" \...
FIX

Download the script first, inspect it, verify its checksum, then run it. Do not pipe curl/wget output directly to sh/bash. Prefer package manager installs.

FP?

Likely FP if the download is from a well-known installer domain (e.g., brew.sh, rustup.rs), though this pattern is inherently risky even with trusted sources.

HIGH
Download-and-execute
L1018

Detects patterns of downloading and piping to shell execution

curl -s -X POST "https://api.bfl.ai/v1/${BFL_MODEL}" \
  -H "accept: application/json" \
  -H "x-key: $BFL_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "prompt": "<WRITE_YOUR_PROMPT_...
FIX

Download the file first, verify its integrity (checksum, signature), inspect it, then run it. Prefer package managers over raw downloads. Never fetch-and-run in one step.

FP?

Likely FP if the target is a well-known installer (e.g., rustup, Homebrew) from its canonical HTTPS domain, though the pattern is inherently risky.

HIGH
Curl or wget piped to shell
L1018

Detects downloading scripts piped directly to a shell interpreter

curl -s -X POST "https://api.bfl.ai/v1/${BFL_MODEL}" \
  -H "accept: application/json" \
  -H "x-key: $BFL_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "prompt": "<WRITE_YOUR_PROMPT_...
FIX

Download the script first, inspect it, verify its checksum, then run it. Do not pipe curl/wget output directly to sh/bash. Prefer package manager installs.

FP?

Likely FP if the download is from a well-known installer domain (e.g., brew.sh, rustup.rs), though this pattern is inherently risky even with trusted sources.

HIGH
Curl or wget piped to shell
L1042

Detects downloading scripts piped directly to a shell interpreter

curl -s -X GET "$POLLING_URL" \
  -H "accept: application/json" \
  -H "x-key: $BFL_API_KEY"
```

When status is `Ready`, extract the returned image URL/bytes according to BFL response shape, write to...
FIX

Download the script first, inspect it, verify its checksum, then run it. Do not pipe curl/wget output directly to sh/bash. Prefer package manager installs.

FP?

Likely FP if the download is from a well-known installer domain (e.g., brew.sh, rustup.rs), though this pattern is inherently risky even with trusted sources.

HIGH
Download-and-execute
L1042

Detects patterns of downloading and piping to shell execution

curl -s -X GET "$POLLING_URL" \
  -H "accept: application/json" \
  -H "x-key: $BFL_API_KEY"
```

When status is `Ready`, extract the returned image URL/bytes according to BFL response shape, write to...
FIX

Download the file first, verify its integrity (checksum, signature), inspect it, then run it. Prefer package managers over raw downloads. Never fetch-and-run in one step.

FP?

Likely FP if the target is a well-known installer (e.g., rustup, Homebrew) from its canonical HTTPS domain, though the pattern is inherently risky.

MEDIUM
Section claims authority and urgency with dangerous instructions
L2

Section claims authority and urgency with dangerous instructions

name: clawgram
version: 1.0.1
description: A social network for AI agents.
homepage: https://clawgram.org/skill.md
metadata:
openclaw:
requires:
env:
- CLAWGRAM_API_KEY
bins:
- curl
config:
- ~/.openc...
FIX

Remove false authority claims (e.g., claiming administrator or root-level access) from tool descriptions. Tool descriptions should describe capabilities, not claim elevated roles.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is documentation explaining role-based access control concepts or describing user personas, not impersonating a system role.

MEDIUM
Fetch URL and use as instructions
L74

Detects fetching external URLs and using the content as agent instructions or rules

curl -fsSL https://clawgram.org/rules
FIX

Sanitize or validate all external inputs (file contents, API responses, user messages) before including them in prompts or tool calls. Implement input/output boundaries between trusted and untrusted data.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is the skill's own instruction set describing how to handle user input, not an actual injection payload.

MEDIUM
Fetch URL and use as instructions
L139

Detects fetching external URLs and using the content as agent instructions or rules

curl -fsSL https://clawgram.org/rules
FIX

Sanitize or validate all external inputs (file contents, API responses, user messages) before including them in prompts or tool calls. Implement input/output boundaries between trusted and untrusted data.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is the skill's own instruction set describing how to handle user input, not an actual injection payload.

MEDIUM
Read sensitive files and transmit externally
L176

Detects skills that both read sensitive credential files and send data to external services

cat >> ~/.openclaw/.env + post via `POST /api
FIX

Block access to git credentials, SSH keys, and repository tokens. If git operations are needed, use scoped deploy keys and restrict the tool to specific repositories.

FP?

Likely FP if the match is documentation about git configuration (e.g., setting up git credentials helper) rather than code that reads and transmits them.

MEDIUM
External API response drives agent behavior
L736

Detects skills where external API responses control agent decisions or actions

call Clawgram API  + according to xAI response
FIX

Do not include content from MCP tool responses verbatim in system prompts or tool descriptions. Sanitize all dynamic content before incorporating it into prompt context.

FP?

Likely FP if the match is a static tool description that mentions dynamic content handling in its documentation, not an actual injection vector.

LOW
Cross-tool data leakage
L176

Detects patterns where credential or secret reads are combined with external data transmission

cat >> ~/.openclaw/.env + post with the result
FIX

Prevent credentials and sensitive data obtained by one MCP tool from being passed to other tools. Implement data isolation between tools and restrict cross-tool data flow for secrets.

FP?

Likely FP if the cross-tool data flow is intentional API authentication (e.g., a tool fetches an auth token that another tool uses for the same service).

LOW
Chained shell command execution
L743

Detects chained commands using shell operators with dangerous operations

curl -s -X POST "$BASE/agents/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"YourAgentName","description":"What you do"}'

# Check claim/auth status
curl -s "$BASE/agents/status" \...
FIX

Break chained commands into discrete, individually validated steps. Avoid piping untrusted output directly into a shell interpreter.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is a documentation example showing a common installer one-liner for a well-known tool with a canonical URL.

LOW
Chained shell command execution
L1018

Detects chained commands using shell operators with dangerous operations

curl -s -X POST "https://api.bfl.ai/v1/${BFL_MODEL}" \
  -H "accept: application/json" \
  -H "x-key: $BFL_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "prompt": "<WRITE_YOUR_PROMPT_...
FIX

Break chained commands into discrete, individually validated steps. Avoid piping untrusted output directly into a shell interpreter.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is a documentation example showing a common installer one-liner for a well-known tool with a canonical URL.

LOW
Remote SDK or script fetch as agent input
L1042

Detects fetching remote documentation or code to load as agent context

curl -s -X GET  + https://clawgram.org/skill.md
FIX

Pin the SDK or script to a specific version and verify its checksum after download. Prefer installing SDKs via a package manager instead of fetching remote scripts directly.

FP?

Likely FP if the match is documentation showing how to install an official SDK (e.g., Google Cloud SDK, AWS CLI) from its canonical URL.

LOW
Chained shell command execution
L1042

Detects chained commands using shell operators with dangerous operations

curl -s -X GET "$POLLING_URL" \
  -H "accept: application/json" \
  -H "x-key: $BFL_API_KEY"
```

When status is `Ready`, extract the returned image URL/bytes according to BFL response shape, write to...
FIX

Break chained commands into discrete, individually validated steps. Avoid piping untrusted output directly into a shell interpreter.

FP?

Likely FP if the matched text is a documentation example showing a common installer one-liner for a well-known tool with a canonical URL.