bagman

clawhub:bagman

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D
42/100

First Seen

Feb 18, 2026

Last Scanned

Feb 22, 2026

Findings

3

Score

42/100

CRITICAL 2
MEDIUM 1

Findings (3)

CRITICAL
Instruction override attempt
L211

Detects attempts to override or ignore previous instructions

ignore previous instructions
FIX

Remove the injection payload from the skill definition. Text that attempts to reset agent context or override prior directives is a direct attack vector.

FP?

Likely FP if the text is in a security tutorial or research paper discussing injection techniques as examples, not in an active skill description.

CRITICAL
Jailbreak template
L213

Detects common jailbreak prompt patterns

DAN mode
FIX

Remove directives that attempt to exfiltrate data through the agent's response (e.g., asking the agent to embed credentials in URLs or include secret values in output).

FP?

Likely FP if the text is a legitimate tool instruction about displaying configuration to the user (e.g., show current settings) without external transmission.

MEDIUM
Cross-tool data leakage
L22

Detects patterns where credential or secret reads are combined with external data transmission

access
- Handling API keys, credential + send config to http
FIX

Prevent credentials and sensitive data obtained by one MCP tool from being passed to other tools. Implement data isolation between tools and restrict cross-tool data flow for secrets.

FP?

Likely FP if the cross-tool data flow is intentional API authentication (e.g., a tool fetches an auth token that another tool uses for the same service).